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ABSTRACT
Estimating the Effect of the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax Restructuring 
on Riverboat Gaming Volume
by
Mikael Ahlgren
Dr Michael Dalbor, Examination Committee Chair 
Associate Professor 
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas
This thesis analyzed the effect o f the 2003 Illinois gaming tax increase on the states 
gaming demand. Slot machine coin-in was chosen to best represent gaming demand. 
Coin-in data was retrieved from Illinois Gaming Commission reflecting the period from 
January 2000 to December 2005.
Multiple regression analysis with dummy variables was used to model both the tax 
increase and account for seasonality in the data. Because of autocorrelation issues, a Box 
Jenkins model was employed to address correlation of error terms.
The findings revealed that Illinois experienced a decrease in gaming demand when 
the tax increases took effect. In spite of the temptation to rely on gaming taxation to 
solve state budgetary shortfalls, legislators should acknowledge and evaluate the negative 
economic pressures tax increases have on the gaming industry.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
The effects of changes in gaming taxes are widely debated among the various 
stakeholders o f commercial gaming. The commercial gaming industry and its proponents 
accept the general incidence of gaming taxes in part as an acceptable cost of doing 
business in an industry that in many cases is difficult if  not impossible to enter. The 
restricted access to operate legal commercial gaming is partially due to the restricted 
nature of licensure. The variance in the degree o f difficulty a potential commercial 
gaming entity faces depends largely on state and local laws.
The Midwestern United States commercial gaming market has experienced two 
trends since they opened in the early nineties; states have consistently deregulated to 
better position their operators to compete for local and interstate gaming business. The 
second trend has been the consistent increase in the various states’ percentage draw from 
gaming revenues. These monies are paid in the form of gaming taxes and have often 
occurred in conjunction with deregulation. The purpose of this research is to quantify the 
effect of one o f these gaming tax increases on gaming demand/wagering volume which in 
this thesis is represented by coin-in. Coin-in is a gaming term describing the total 
amount of monies inserted into a slot machine. In contrast, table drop, a term 
occasionally used by researchers to represent gaming volume, only describes the amount
a player purchases at a table and not the amount wagered (Kilby, Fox, & Lucas, 2004). It 
is entirely conceivable a casino patron could purchase a million dollars in chips and put 
none of them at risk. Coin-in by contrast represents actual monies wagered and therefore, 
functions as a more accurate representation of demand (Eisendrath, Bernhard, Lucas, & 
Murphy, 2008).
Illinois riverboats operators saw their highest tier gaming tax rate reach 70 percent on 
July 1, 2003. The rate had grown steadily from the original flat rate o f 20 percent o f 
adjusted gross revenue that the Illinois legislature had deemed suitable when commercial 
gaming was initially introduced in 1991 (Illinois Gaming Board, 2005). The outcry from 
commercial gaming and its benefactors to both this particular increase and the general 
trend of inflating gaming taxes was considerable. Christenson (2005) warns that gaming 
taxes that rise above the 20 percent threshold begin to sway the industry from a focus on 
economic development and related job creation and capital investment. Christenson also 
cautions that rates that climb above the 35 percent level prohibit the economic viability of 
riverboat or racino operations in all but the most significantly undersupplied markets such 
as the Chicago area in Illinois (Christiansen, 2005). Journalists Jamie Mckee and Marc 
Falcone predict that Illinois’ attempt to capture increased revenues by increasing gaming 
taxes would have the opposite effect. The tax increase trend had already restricted 
operators innovations and additions that had been previously been planned to maintain 
competitiveness with operators in surrounding states like Indiana, Missouri, and Iowa 
(McKee, 2003). Falcone (2003) who is also a gaming analyst with Deutsche Bank 
foretells that the three boats in the Illinois marketplace that had the potential to hit the 70 
percent gaming tax threshold would actively attempt to manage their operations to reduce
revenues. He also foretells that all operators will engage in layoffs, restrict comps, rely 
on fewer table games, and close ancillary facilities such as restaurants and hotels 
(Falcone, 2003b). It is noteworthy to mention that if  Falcone is correct in his prediction, 
the gaming tax scenario provides gaming managers a motivation contrary to the universal 
capitalist goal o f maximizing profits.
In an effort to examine the impact o f the 2003 tax restructuring this thesis is 
organized as follows. To give the reader some perspective, a brief overview of gaming 
taxes in general will be presented. In particular, by examining gaming taxes with respect 
to how they are levied in Illinois, the reader will better understand the market under 
scrutiny. Through an examination of how the Midwestern gaming industry has evolved 
over the decade preceding the tax increases, a perspective o f how these changes impact 
the market will be provided. After the overview is completed, a review summarizing 
existing literature on implementation of other similar tax increases on hospitality 
concerns, commercial real estate, the tobacco industry, and eventually the gaming 
industry will be undertaken. This literature review will address the content, the related 
research, and the particular methodologies chosen by various researchers to analyze data 
with similarities to the data reflecting the Illinois gaming tax increase.
The framework constructed by the study of related literature will direct the researcher 
to the methodology appropriate to analyze the changes in gaming demand related to the 
gaming tax changes. Using slot machine coin-in as representative of gaming demand, the 
research will employ a multiple regression model with dummy variables to represent the 
2003 tax restructuring as well as account for the seasonal influences inherent in 
hospitality time series models. Finally, the analysis will examine the residuals from the
multiple regression model to determine whether autocorrelation issues are resolved. The 
results will reveal whether the implementation of a 70% tax tier and the accompanying 
gaming tax restructuring had a statistically significant negative effect on gaming demand 
as represented by the coin-in variable.
The implications of the findings of this study are of importance to both operators of 
commercial gaming and the state and local entities that both oversee and profit from 
commercial gaming’s revenues. If, as the gaming interests allege, state governments 
regard commercial gaming as “magical money pumps exempt from the economic laws 
that govern other activities -  and able to pay whatever taxes are needed to make budgets 
balance” (Christiansen, 2005) and the results of this study indicate a increased gaming 
taxes correlates with a decrease in gaming demand, state legislators may want to 
reconsider past decisions or at the very least, consider these results when future policy on 
gaming taxes is instituted. If gaming demand negatively impacted by inflated gaming 
taxes, legislators who have legalized commercial gaming to supplement state and local 
governments must be held to account if  their decision to grab short-term revenue to ease 
budgetary woes, negatively impacts their communities ability to share in long-term 
revenues.
The results of this research along with their inherent implications must be considered 
with perspective to this study’s limitations. First and foremost this study looks at a single 
gaming tax increase in Illinois. Additional research addressing gaming tax fluctuations in 
other states or foreign locales would help determine the representative value of this study. 
Secondly, coin-in is chosen as the variable representing gaming demand. Additional
research examining other measures o f demand such as table drop would further the 
overall understanding o f how gaming demand reacts to fluctuations in gaming taxation.
CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
Introduction
This chapter provides a framework for understanding the impact on gaming demand 
from changes to the Illinois gaming taxes in 2003. In addition, research in both gaming 
and related topics such as real estate taxes and hotel occupancy taxes, is drawn upon to 
provide reference for methodological alternatives. A general overview of gaming 
research assessing regulation and tax changes is included to provide a more 
comprehensive understanding of gaming taxes, regulation changes, and gaming 
proliferation in the Midwestern, United States.
Illinois and Commercial Gaming
Illinois Legalizes Riverboat Gaming
In February 1990, Illinois became the second U.S. state to legalize riverboat gambling 
when the Riverboat Gambling Act was enacted. Neighboring state Iowa preceded Illinois 
when they legalized riverboat gambling in July o f 1989 (American Gaming Association, 
2006). Illinois’ legislation authorized their Gaming Board to license up to ten operators. 
The first riverboat, in Alton, opened September 11, 1991. The communities o f Alton, 
Aurora, East Dubuque, East St. Louis, Elgin, Joliet, Metropolis, Peoria, and Rock Island 
were all granted licenses by 1996 (Illinois Gaming Board, 2005).
Approaches to Legalized Gaming
Illinois adopted the “New Jersey” approach when it legalized commercial gaming 
within its borders. The “New Jersey” approach is characterized by the use of gambling 
for the purpose of directing economic development to a restricted number of 
communities, in this case along particular waterways. The “New Jersey Approach” 
tends to base decisions on the potential negatives and actively differentiate the gaming 
industry from other industry, justifying a more encompassing role for government. This 
model utilizes commercial gaming to create enterprise zones which contribute benefits; 
such as, capital investment, public sector revenue, jobs and increased tourism to a 
predetermined number of locations. This approach lends itself to relatively stricter 
controls on the industry. The utilization of riverboats further underscores the “New 
Jersey” approach as the boats are both symbolically and physically separated from the 
community at large. This divide emphasizes the intention to adopt gaming to address a 
particular need, while mitigating anticipated negative repercussions {The national 
gambling impact study commission final report, 1999).
The “Nevada” model is different from the “New Jersey” model primarily in that it 
views gambling as a business, which despite necessary safeguards, is best shaped by 
market forces. Government’s role is primarily the oversight function. By ensuring 
honest games and discouraging organized crime, the gaming industry is left with the 
responsibility o f choosing location and deciding whether to add facilities. Other than 
Nevada itself, Mississippi is an example of a state that followed the “Nevada” model 
{The national gambling impact study commission final report, 1999).
Midwest Riverboat Gaming
Illinois and the three commercial gaming states on its border, Iowa, Indiana, and 
Missouri, all followed the “New Jersey” model to the extent that they limited both the 
number o f facilities and locations (The national gambling impact study commission final 
report, 1999).
The state of Illinois authorizes each licensed riverboat operation to offer up to 1,200 
gaming positions. These positions may be a combination o f table games and electronic 
devices. The Riverboat Gambling Act was amended in 1999 to allow riverboats to be 
permanently moored at docksites, thus ending the requirement that operators must 
conduct cruises on waterways. The Gambling Act further requires that patrons of 
gambling areas of the boats be 21 years of age. Wagering in the casinos must be 
conducted by cashless means, including; chips, tokens or vouchers.
Indiana, on the eastern border o f Illinois, legalized commercial gaming in November 
o f 1993. The first, of what has grown to ten Riverboats, opened in December o f 1995. 
Commercial gaming in Indiana was restricted to Riverboats (Anderson, 2005).
Since the main topic of this research is gaming taxes, it may be necessary to 
acknowledge that some dispute exists as to whether collection of revenues generated 
from gaming actually constitutes a tax. Some scholars have suggested that revenues 
collected by the state from gaming operations do not constitute a tax, since gaming is a 
voluntary act (Rivenbark & Rounsaville, 1996). However, Mikesell and Zorn (1988) 
argued that net revenues generated from lottery operations were not discernable from 
revenues captured from other sumptuary excise taxes. In both cases, revenues were 
generated by means of a voluntary proposition and result in mandatory payments to the
State treasury (Mikesell & Zom, 1988). For the purpose o f this thesis, revenues generated 
from gaming operations which are paid to the state are referred to as gaming taxes.
Gaming taxes are typically generated by wagering taxes, fees, and/or admissions 
taxes. Wagering taxes are collected by all U.S. states that host commercial casinos 
(American Gaming Association, 2006). Despite some minute differences in how 
particular states define the tax base, all states use some form of gross gambling receipt 
minus payouts, or adjusted gross receipts (AGR) (Anderson, 2005). Fees are an addition 
source of revenue for many commercial gaming states. Riverboat states often charge a 
licensing fee, which in the case of Iowa is assessed based on capacity or in Mississippi, it 
is assessed as a percentage of AGR (Anderson, 2005). Admission taxes are the third 
source o f revenue for both states and local government units, and are typical in riverboat 
states. In these states, each gambler is required to pay a fee when entering or boarding 
the facility (Anderson, 2005). Admission taxes range from a set dollar amount to a 
graduated tax assessment. For example, some states vary the charge with respect to size 
of facility or past visitor volume (American Gaming Association, 2006). Table 1 
illustrates the changes to Gaming taxation in Illinois and its neighbor state Indiana from 
years 2000 to 2005.
Table 1
2000-2005 Illinois & Indiana State Riverboat Taxes
State 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Illinois Graduated Graduated Graduated Tax Graduated Graduated Graduated
T ax Rate Tax Rate Rate from 15% Tax Rate Tax Rate Tax Rate
from 20% from 15% to from 15% to from 15% to from 15% to
to 35% o f to 35% o f 50% (M aximum 70% o f  gross 70% o f  gross 50% o f  gross
gross gross tax rate through gaming gam ing gam ing
gam ing gam ing June 2002  - revenue,$3- revenue,$3- revenue,$2-
revenue,$2 revenue,$2 35% ) o f  gross $5 per $5 per $3 per
per patron per patron gam ing patron patron patron
adm issions adm issions revenue,$3 per adm issions adm issions adm issions
tax tax patron
adm issions tax
tax tax tax
Indiana 20%  tax on 20%  tax Graduated tax Graduated Graduated Graduated
gross rate on rate from 15% to tax rate from tax rate from Tax Rate o f
gam ing gross 35%  (M aximum 15% to 35% 15% to 35% 15% to 35%
revenue gam ing tax rate through o f  gross o f  gross o f  gross
revenue,$3 June 2002  - gaming gam ing gam ing
per patron 20% ) o f  gross revenue, $3 revenue, $3 revenue,3$
adm ission gam ing revenue, per patron per patron per patron
tax $3 per patron adm issions adm issions adm issions
adm issions tax tax tax tax
N ote. Gam ing Taxation  
2006 . Retrieved April 1
Rates were retrieved from American Gam ing A ssociation  State o f  the States 2000- 
2, 2007  from http://ww w.am ericangam ing.ora/survev/index.cfm
It is significant to note that all gaming taxes illustrated in Table 1 are in addition to and 
not in lieu o f regular business income and real estate taxes. Gaming taxes are often 
characterized as being paid for the privilege of operating gaming facilities (Christiansen, 
2005).
Illinois Gaming Tax Rates
By means of the Riverboat Gambling Act, the State of Illinois assesses taxes on 
riverboat gambling operations by both an admission tax and a wagering tax. Table 2 
illustrates in greater detail the changes in the graduated gaming taxes in Illinois from July 
2001 to July 2005.
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Table 2
Detailed Overview of Illinois Gaming Taxes
July 1, 2002 -  June 30 , 2003 Adjusted Gross Revenue Tax Rates
15% up to 
$25
M illion
22.5%  over 
$25 up to  
$50 M illion
27.5%  over  
$50 up to 
$75 M illion
32.5%  over 
$75 up to 
$100 M illion
37.5%  over 
$100 up to 
$150 M illion
45%  over 
$150 up to 
$200 M illion
50% over
$200
M illion
July 1, 2003 -  June 30 , 2005 Adjusted Gross Revenue Tax Rates
15% up to 27.5%  over 32.5%  over 37.5%  over 45%  over 50% over 70% over
$25 $25 up to $37.5 up to $50 up to $75 up to $ 100 up to $200
M illion $37.5 $50 M illion $75 M illion $100 $200 M illion
M illion M illion M illion
N ote. A dm ission tax rate; $3, $4 or $5 Per A dm ission-D ependent upon previous calendar year adm ission  
total (L ess than 1 m illion = $3, 1 m illion to 2.3 million -  $4, greater than 2.3 m illion =  $5) Local share = 
S I , A ll over $ 1 =  State share
AGR Tax; Progressive Tax Rate (indicated above) on calendar Y TD  AGR level (G ross G am ing Receipts 
minus Patron W in) Local Share = 5% o f  AGR at all levels, State Share = remainder o f  progressive % 
Common School Fund receives the increased AGR Taxes (Increase o f  7 /1 /2003 AGR Rates over 7 /1 /2002  
Rates
July 1, 2005  Adjusted Gross Revenue Tax Rates
15% up to 
$25
M illion
22.5%  over 
$25 up to 
$50 M illion
27.5%  over 
$50 up to 
$75 M illion
32.5%  over 
$75 up to 
$100  
M illion
37.5%  over 
$100 up to 
$150  
Million
45%  over 
$150  up to 
$200  
M illion
50% over
$200
M illion
N ote. Information retrieved from Illinois G am ing Board annual report 2005 . Retrieved March 10, 2007  
from http;//w ww .igb.state.il.us/annualreport/
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Illinois Overview
The initial tax increase noted above that was approved by the Illinois Legislature on 
June 3, 2002, had a profound negative impact on the gaming market. As a reference the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average declined by 2.2 percent on that date. Gaming stocks 
declined significantly further as illustrated in Table 3.
Table 3
Gaming Stock Market Performance June 3. 2002 _______________________________
Closing Price
Company___________________________________ Percentage Change
Mandalay Resort Group -6.4%
Harrah's Entertainment -7.7%
Boyd Gam ing -14.4%
H ollyw ood Casinos____________________________ -20% ____________________________________________
N ote. Prices are reported from the M ichael P ollock ’s G am ing Industry Observer in the report, 
Exam ining impacts on Atlantic City o f  proposed tax increases, VET com petition, Report retrieved from 
the files o f  the American Gam ing A ssociation, 1299 Pennsylvania A ve., N W  Suite 1175, W ashington, D C. 
2004.
MGM, who did not have any gaming interest in Illinois, withdrew a bid of $615 
million to acquire a casino license in a Chicago suburb. A Harrah’s conference call to 
investors revealed the cancellation of plans to build a $40 million hotel to enhance the 
Metropolis riverboat. MGM Mirage released a statement announcing their intention to 
focus their efforts on jurisdictions that provide a “stable and reasonable tax environment” 
(Pollock, Morowitz, & Gushin).
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Tax Effects
In an attempt to draw parallels to other situations that mirror the increase in gaming 
taxes in Illinois, reviewing research that addressed hotel occupancy taxes, the 1986 Tax 
Reform Act on Real Estate, and sin taxes on cigarettes proved instructive. These 
particular examples not only informed the understanding of likely effects o f inherent 
changes to taxation rates but also provided insight into various suitably applicable 
methodologies that provided valuable analysis into the Illinois gaming tax restructuring.
Occupancy Taxes
Hiemstra and Ismail (1992) examined the enactment of occupancy taxes by 
municipalities. They asserted that legislators erroneously chose these means of 
generating revenues because occupancy taxes primarily affect travelers who are non­
constituents. However, the researchers showed by analyzing the elasticity of demand 
(occupancy) that the saying Tanstaafl rang true. There was no such thing as a free lunch 
in this case, as a 9.8% room tax resulted in a 3% drop in occupancy (Hiemstra & Ismail, 
1992; Hiemstra & Ismail, 1993). The aforementioned scenario mirrors the allegations of 
gaming’s stakeholders who suggest that legislators view commercial gaming as a 
bottomless source of income which is impermeable to classic economic pressures 
(Christiansen, 2005).
1986 Tax Reform Act
The 1986 Tax Reform Act was characterized as the most significant adaptation of the 
tax code since its formation in the 1950’s. When the tax reform was analyzed, real 
estate, in particular, proved to occupy the mantle of most affected industries. The 
primary aspects of real estate investment impacted were depreciation scheduling; in
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addition, flow-through tax losses were reduced, and loss offset limitations were instituted 
(Sanger, Sirmans, & Turnbull, 1990).
Sanger (1990) utilized intervention analysis (defined as an intervention in a time 
series) because an event, in this case the tax reform, represented a change in the 
stochastic process. The dependent variable in this study was the security returns of Real 
Estate Investment Trusts, known as REITS. These entities invest in real estate and real 
estate related assets with the purpose o f generating a return for their investors (US 
securities & exchange commission.2QQA). Sanger employed dummy variables to model 
the tax intervention as well as account for seasonal effects. The study’s results indicated 
that the market assessed the changes in the tax code to the disadvantage of real estate 
owners (Sanger et al., 1990).
Another study that sought to understand the effects of the 1986 Tax Reform Act was 
undertaken by Smith and Woodward (1996). The researchers sought to evaluate the 
effects of the above mentioned tax reform in terms of the consequence the changes had 
on the value of apartments. Utilizing a time-series cross-sectional panel data design to 
examine their data, the researchers found that a couple of obstacles threatened the quality 
of their results. The degree of overbuilding needed to be controlled for the examined 
regions. In addition, because of the nature o f time-series analysis the authors 
acknowledged the potential for autocorrelation. Tests proved autocorrelation was a 
factor and the researchers relied on the Parks method of analysis to address the issue.
Applying a dummy variable to represent the tax changes and controlling for the 
degree of overbuilding, the researchers concluded the 1986 Tax Reform Act .had a 
statistically significant negative effect on apartment values (Smith & Woodward, 1996).
14
Cigarettes and Sin Taxes
Sin Taxes are taxes that are attaehed to serviees or produets that are viewed as vices. 
This form of tax is retained in part to discourage an activity or the acquisition of a 
product. These taxes also serve to generate revenue for the government entity be it a 
federal, state of local municipality, who levies the tax (Investopedia.). Cigarette 
smoking, drinking aleohol and wagering are all aetivities that are subject to sin taxes.
Former United States Surgeon General, C. Everett Koop, wrote in 2004 that 
studies have eonsistently shown that inereasing the eost of tobacco products reduces their 
demand (Koop, Riehmond, & Steinfeld, 2004). Koop dubiously suggested that these “sin 
taxes” only affeet the sinner, ignoring the impact of loss of demand for a product an 
entire industry and its many stakeholders depend on to provide salaries, investment 
returns, and pensions.
An example of a study that supports Koop’s eorrelation between sin taxes and a 
reduction in demand is Wei Tan’s use of statistical simulations in his work with smoking 
rates. Tan’s simulations consistently reinforced the negative impaet tax inereases had on 
smoking rate in both the short and the long term (Tan, 2006).
Gaming Forecasting
Deregulation
A number of researchers have addressed how deregulation has affected gaming 
volume. Methodologically, these examinations of deregulation were often similar as well 
as pertinent to understanding how to approach a tax increase. Although the effeet of 
deregulation and a tax increase might be opposite, they both share a main characteristic. 
In both events a single inflection point is introduced in the analysis of a time series
15
(Eisendrath, 2005). In the Midwestern commercial gaming market, these acts of 
deregulation have often been tied to increases in gaming tax rates.
Deregulation in Atlantic City
In Nichols (1998) looked at the 1991 deregulation o f Atlantic City commercial 
gaming, Nichols chose a Box Jenkins autoregressive moving average or ARIMA model 
to conduct his analysis. Nichols measured the effect of an increase in operating hours 
and slot machine space on gaming win. The study acknowledged an inlierent 
shortcoming of operationalizing the demand or volume variable as casino win. Win, or 
gambler’s losses equals gross gaming revenue. Gross gaming revenue is problematic as a 
measure because it includes money that is originally distributed by the casino as 
complimentaries or “comps”; therefore the casino is winning back its own cash. Nichols 
quantified the comp ratio as 8.5% of total win. Nichols supported his choice of gaming 
win because, unlike EBITDA and general revenue related data for example, win does not 
include non-gaming revenues which distort the results (Nichols, 1998b).
Prior to NichoTs research, Shonkwiler (1993) relied on a structural time series model 
to evaluate the impact o f Atlantic City commercial casinos on gaming volume in Nevada. 
This study addressed the impact o f an extraneous event on time series data. Shonkwiler 
supported his methodological choice by promoting the value of structural time series for 
the modeling of linear (stochastic) trends and seasonality. Shonkwiler’s research 
concluded that the introduction of Atlantic City casinos reduced Nevada gaming revenues 
by between 10 and 12 percent (Shonkwiler, 1993).
16
Deregulation o f  Midwest Riverboats
Nichols (1998a) also addressed deregulation of the United States Midwestern 
riverboat market the same year he produced his study on Atlantic City. In a response to 
the 1994 Illinois’ introduction o f less regulated riverboat gambling, Iowa revamped their 
1991 original strict inaugural regulations and eliminated mandated sailing, loss limits and 
space restrictions. Choosing casino win, total admissions and win per admission as his 
dependent variables, Nichols used regression analysis to control for the effect of day of 
the week, seasonality, location, and per capita income while attempting to evaluate the 
impact of deregulation. Nichols’ results indicated that deregulation was an impetus for 
significant cross-border substitution as well having been responsible for increases in the 
three dependent variables; win, win per admission, and admission (Nichols, 1998). 
Nichols work with Iowa and Illinois riverboat deregulation has obvious similarities to this 
study’s investigation into the impact of gaming taxation in Illinois.
Econometric Models
Thalheimer and Ali (2003) developed an econometric model to identify determinates 
o f demand, particularly slot demand, for 24 Midwestern riverboats and racinos. The 
researchers examined the effects of “traditional demand” variables as well as location and 
government restrictions. Thalheimer and Ali identified variables such betting limits, 
access, win, and number of tables in an effort to explain changes in slot volume. Slot 
volume was divided by the market area population surrounding the riverboat or casino in 
an effort to control for the population effect. The study’s model showed an extremely 
impressive degree of explanatory power (R squared = 0.937) thus concluding that 
population and its access to facility was positively related to slot demand, access to
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competing facilities had a negative impact, and restrictive limits on gaming was also 
negatively related to slot demand (Thalheimer & Ali, 2003). Despite the similarities, it 
is noteworthy to point out that the Thalheimer and Ali (2003) research examined the 
impact of the independent variable such as access and limits at the single property level 
rather than gaming volume at the state level (Eisendrath, 2005).
In an effort to assist the accuracy of Nevada’s budgetary planning and with the 
recognition o f the significance that gaming taxes play in the Nevada state budget, Cargill 
and Eadington (1978) endeavored to construct a means for forecasting gaming revenues. 
By first assessing seasonal variations and patterns and then employing multiple 
regression equations to identify statistically significant correlations, the researchers 
finally chose the Box Jenkins method to provide the forecasting. The earlier stages of 
this often cited study o f gaming reflected the methodology choice o f this more narrow 
research (Eadington & William R., 1978). Like Cargill and Eadington, this study sought 
to identify whether a particular tax increase has an effect on gaming volume. Unlike 
Cargill and Eadington, this study o f the 2003 Illinois tax increase did not attempt to 
forecast the long term effects of the restructuring primarily because the change was not 
permanent.
The Illinois Market
Turco and Riley (1996) looked at the factors that are important to riverboat gamblers 
when choosing a facility and also investigated alternate activities a gambler might 
consider engaging in with their gaming budget. The researchers’ concentrated their study 
on the Illinois market. Loyalty as reflected by favorite place to play was shown to be an 
important factor for gamers when choosing gambling venues (Turco & Riley, 1996).
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Based on Turco and Riley’s investigation it is feasible to investigate an impact on gaming 
demand from a reduction of complimentaries which are dispensed to gamers in an effort 
to build loyalty
Bowen (1994) addressed the value of relationship marketing when he pointed out the 
connection between satisfaction and loyalty. His article described the emergence o f slot 
clubs and the use of targeted promotions to develop relationships with known players 
whose values were then tracked by the casino. Bowen identified an Aurora, Illinois 
riverboat as an example of a facility that tracked and rated its players. After assessing a 
player’s worth, the casinos could choose to forgo parking revenue in exchange for what 
the operator believed would be a better relationship with their customer (Bowen, 1994). 
Gaming analyst Falcone echoed this relationship and predicted a reduction in comp play, 
food, and lodging when describing the 2003 Illinois tax restructuring (Falcone, 2003b).
To understand the pressure that falls onto marketing expenditures such as costs, it is 
important to understand that unlike products like tobacco and alcohol, casino operators 
do not provide a product with price elasticity because of their relative difficulty in 
passing on increases in operator expenses to their customers. An operator could employ 
unpopular measures such as tightening the hold or par of their slot machines and thereby 
raise the price to play but this may lead to a decrease in demand. Typically, the burden of 
tax increases rests on operators and is expressed through lower rates of invested capital, 
decreased development projects, reduction in employees, and in the limitation of 
marketing and/or complimentary expenses (Falcone, 2003a).
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Measuring Demand
When foreeasting or quantifying gaming volume, researchers have relied on 
numerous variables as mentioned throughout this review o f related literature. This study 
will utilize slot maehine eoin-in as the indieator of gaming demand or volume. The 
deeision to rely on coin-in is based on a number of faetors. First and foremost, all the 
alternative measures of gaming demand are fundamentally problematie. The majority of 
operators do not and/or eannot quantify the amount wagered on table games (Eisendrath 
et ah, 2008). The measure of table drop, as previously mentioned, reflects the amount 
eonverted to ehips and does not represent the amount wagered. Revenue figures ean 
vary with short-term luek and volatility on both the player and easino’s part (Kilby et ah, 
2004). Therefore, coin-in reflects the most aecurate and least eontaminated measure of 
gaming volume (Eisendrath et ah, 2008; hueas, Dunn, & Kharitonova, 2006).
The seeond reason this research relied on eoin-in to represent gaming demand is the 
predominanee o f the eoin-in eontribution to the overall eommercial easino revenue 
sources. Numerous researehers on the has Vegas, Nevada market have chosen coin-in as 
the preferential proxy for gaming demand and justified the decision partially due to the 
important eontribution eoin-in makes towards overall revenues. Slot win aeeounts for 
approximately 50 pereent of gaming win in the Las Vegas market (Eisendrath et ah, 
2008). In eontrast, slot maehines or eleetronie gaming deviees (EGDs) aeeount for 
nearly 90 percent of Illinois adjusted gaming revenues (Illinois Gaming Board, 2005). In 
an effort to compare the contributions of table games as they compare to slots, a 
researeher might choose to eontrast table drop to coin-in or simply compare the adjusted 
gross revenues o f the games. As previously mentioned both AGR and table drop are
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problematic. For the sake o f comparison comparing the games on the basis o f AGR is 
the most accurate because it reflects actual play, which is not guaranteed when table drop 
enters the equation. Figure 1 shows the different AGR contributions by the two revenue 
sources: table games and slots (described as EGD’s in this example).
Time Series Plot of Table Game AGR, EGD AGR, Total AGR
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Figure 1. Adjusted Gross Revenue contribution o f both Table Games and EGD’s (Slots) 
Data retrieved from the Illinois Gaming Board Annual Reports 2001, 2003, and 2005.
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CHAPTER 3 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Introduction
This chapter first presents the hypotheses to be tested. In addition the source and type 
of data are revealed. Dependent and independent variables are identified and the use of 
multiple regression is briefly explained. In addition, assumptions inherent to the use of 
multiple regression is presented along with the frequent violation o f these assumptions 
that typically occurs when analyzing time series data. Lastly, methods for countering the 
aforementioned violations are discussed.
Hypotheses
It is hypothesized that the restructuring of the Illinois gaming tax in 2003 will show a 
negative impact on gaming demand as represented by the dependent coin-in response 
variable. The term “2003 70% tax and overall tax restructuring” represents the 
independent or predictor dummy variable for the tax change.
Main Hypothesis
The null hypothesis states that there is no difference in coin-in after the Illinois tax 
restructuring. The null is expressed by the equation:
Ho : Coefficient of “2003 70% tax and overall tax restructuring” = 0
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The research hypothesis which predicts that there will be a difference in coin-in is 
expressed by the equation:
H\ : Coefficient of “2003 70% tax and overall tax restructuring’V  0
Secondary Tests fo r  Trend and Seasonality
The multiple linear regression will include a time variable testing for trend. The time 
variable is assigned as follows: the first month is “ 1”, second month “2” and so forth. 
Trend is characterized as the upward or downward movement of a time series over a 
period of time. Trend is typically referred to as long-term growth or decline. When 
analyzing data from a particular industry, trend generally reflects factors such as changes 
in total population, market growth, or long-term changes in per capita income 
(Bowerman, O'Connell, & Koehler, 2005).
Seasonality will be assessed by the use of dummy variables representing the months 
February through December. Seasonality or seasonal variations describe the time series’ 
flow of peaks and valleys that are completed within a calendar year. Factors such as 
weather and customs tend to impact the seasonality of a time series. When using dummy 
variables to test monthly data for seasonality, only 11 months are represented by 
variables. The twelfth month is represented by the constant term of the equation. It 
makes no difference which month is omitted.
Data Collection
Secondary data for this study is compiled from Illinois Gaming Board Monthly 
Revenue Reports (IGB, 2000-2006), comprised of monthly commercial gaming 
information from January 2000 to December 2006. This public data is available from 
the Illinois Gaming Board website and via request from the same entity. Each Illinois
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docksite is required by their licensure to provide this information in a timely manner to 
the state office of the Illinois Gaming Board. The information is made public shortly 
thereafter. As previously discussed, this research will use the independent variable coin- 
in as reported by the various docksites in Illinois for the 60 monthly periods covered. 
Coin-in is reported on a monthly basis by each docksite to the Illinois Gaming Board. 
Coin-in has been chosen as the proxy for gaming demand due to its reliability and due to 
the dominant contribution of slots/EGDs to overall gaming revenue. Figure 2 illustrates a 
detailed breakdown of the relative importance of Slot (EGD) contribution to revenues on 
a docksite by docksite basis.
2003 Table Games vs Slot (EGD's) AGR by
Docksite
$3 5 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
$ 3 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
$ 2 5 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
$ 200 ,000,000
$ 1 5 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
$ 100,000,000
$ 5 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
$0 m i I
y
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Figure 2 Illinois Docksite AGR Comparison of Table Games vs. Slots.
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Linear Regression Model
With a multiple linear regression model (MLR) we have a single dependent variable 
(y) or response variable and more than one independent or predictor variables (x) and the 
objective is to fit a linear equation
This thesis we will attempt to fit the regression model:
Yt = Po + Pit + PzFeb + P]Mar + PjApr + P^May + p ju n e  + P?July + P«Aug + 
p,Sept + Pi.Oct + PiiNov + p.zDec + Pu70%tax + et
7/ = Illinois Statewide Coin-in in dollars
The unknown parameters are found by minimizing the error sum of squares. The 
regression equation relates the average value of y when the independent variables are set 
at(;r .^_,A^).
A dummy variable is used for period that reflects the 70% tax level and the overall 
2003 Illinois tax restructuring = {1 if period with tax hike, 0 otherwise}. The “t” variable 
represents the trend component which as previously mentioned assesses whether there is 
long-term positive or negative movement in the data over time. The months February- 
December are treated as seasonal dummy variables. For example: Feb = {1 if period t is 
February , 0 otherwise}.
The assumption of this model is that error terms are independent and normally 
distributed with mean 0 and a common unknown variance sigma squared. With 
hospitality and gaming data this assumption of independence is often violated. In time 
series regression residuals are tested for autocorrelation. Autocorrelation occurs when 
error terms are not random and positive terms tend to be followed by positive terms and 
negative terms tend to be followed by negative terms. Without assessing diagnosing
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autocorrelation, the predictive value of the model is compromised. Lastly, an additional 
implied implication is that the regression model is linear.
Selection o f  Time Series Model
Because of the seasonal nature of hospitality and gaming, it is necessary to employ 
time series modeling to deal with autocorrelation. One method of addressing seasonality 
is through the use of dummy variables. The main advantage of the dummy variable 
approach is that it results in a regression equation that visibly reveals the impact of 
statistically significant seasonal variation unlike a Box Jenkins Model which operates like 
a ‘black box’ into which the data are entered and a forecast is produced with no insight 
into the impact of the individual variables such as seasonality or trend.
Treating monthly data (coin-in) captured from the Illinois Gaming Board requires the 
creation of dummy variables for 11 months. The twelfth month is represented by the 
constant term of the regression equation. Each month is then tested for significant 
variation and discarded if it proves insignificant. The model implies that the magnitude 
of seasonal variation is independent of the trend of the constant seasonal change.
An important value o f the use of dummy variables is their ability to ensure that 
appropriate seasonal parameters are included in the model for each time period. Once the 
regression model is established, the next step is to examine the error terms for 
autocorrelation. If autocorrelation is a significant factor, then the correct procedure is to 
use a Box Jenkins model to address the problematic error terms.
Intervention models are often employed to model the occurrence o f exceptional 
external events or “interventions”. Examples include labor strikes, terrorist acts like 
September 11, 2001 or policy changes like a tax restructuring. This model adopts the
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appropriately defined dummy variable to represent the occurrence o f the intervention or 
in this case the tax restructuring. The addition of dummy variable can be permanent if 
the intervention such as September 11 is a onetime intervention that continues to impact 
Las Vegas tourism for an indefinite amount of time or in the case of the Illinois gaming 
tax restructuring, the dummy variable can be added when the restructuring occurred and 
subtracted when the gaming tax was returned to previous levels.
Conclusion
The research hypothesis asserting that gaming demand will be negatively impacted by 
increased levels of taxation in Illinois will be tested by multiple regression analysis. The 
regression will include variables describing the long-term movement or trend of Illinois 
gaming demand. In addition, variables will be created to assess the impact of seasonality 
on the time series under scrutiny. The regression’s error terms will be tested for 
autocorrelation, which if present, will be controlled by a Box Jenkins model. The next 
chapter presents the analysis of the data and the results.
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CHAPTER 4 
FINDINGS OF THE STUDY
Introduction
The following pages provide a detailed description o f the analysis of the data with the
methodology presented in the previous chapter. The regression model will be tested and
refined. The impact of autocorrelation will be measured and countered. Finally, the
chapter concludes with the presentation o f the results of the analysis.
Analysis o f  the Data
The following regression model was tested using Minitab 15.
Yt = p.i + Pit + PzFeb + P^Mar + p4Apr + p.May + p June + p ju ly  + p«Aug + 
p.;Sept + PioOct + PiiNov + PiiDec + Pii70%tax + et
The variables were tested for significance at the .05 level.
The first regression was run to test all the variables identified in the model. The intention 
is to eliminate any variables that fail to meet the .05 significance threshold.
2 8
Figure 3 illustrates the Minitab output assessing the significance of the variables of 
interest.
Predictor Coef SE C o e f T P VI:
Constant 1 9 3 9 5 8 9 3 4 2 25004291 77.57 0 . 0 0 0
t 417122 2 9 2 0 2 9 1.43 0 . 1 5 8 1.154
DFeb 4128735 3 2 2 9 4 2 4 3 0.13 0 . 8 9 9 1.833
DMar 167643185 3 22 9 8 2 0 4 5.19 0 . 0 0 0 1 . 8 3 4
DApr 9 3 4 0 2 7 7 7 3 2 3 0 4 8 0 4 2 . 8 9 0 . 0 0 5 1.835
DMay 1 2 1 8 3 3 6 5 5 3 2 3 1 4 0 4 3 3.77 0 . 0 0 0 1 . 8 3 6
D Jun 1 0 9 2 4 9 6 2 3 2 3 2 5 9 1 6 0 . 3 4 0 . 7 3 6 1 . 8 3 7
DJul 1 5 1 3 0 4 1 2 4 3 2 3 7 4 6 4 2 4 . 67 0 . 0 0 0 1.843
DAug 6 7 0 8 5 2 8 9 3 2 3 5 7 5 5 9 2 . 0 7 0 . 0 4 2 1.841
DSep - 1 3 5 9 3 8 3 3 3 2 3 7 7 3 2 0 -0.42 0 . 6 7 6 1.843
DOct 5 8 7 0 9 0 3 3 2 3 9 9 7 0 1 0 . 1 8 0 . 8 5 7 1.845
DNov - 3 4 8 1 8 9 3 4 3 2 4 2 4 6 9 7 -1 . 07 0 . 2 8 7 1 . 8 4 8
DDec -30747198 3 2 4 5 2 3 0 1 - 0 . 9 5 0.347 1.851
70% -143804986 1 5 3 8 6 7 2 3 - 9 . 3 5 0.000 1 . 1 3 9
Figure 3. Assessment o f significance of independent variables o f interest. The Illinois 
tax restructuring dummy variable is noted as “70%”. Each month is described by the 
notation “D” representing dummy + monthly abbreviation. Hence the variable 
representing February in the model is noted as “DFeb” and so one for the eleven months 
examined.
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The trend variable was eliminated based on the inability to reject H,> =  0 (p=.158).
The following graph reflects the lack of overall upward trend to Illinois coin-in during the 
period under scrutiny.
Time Series Plot of sta te  coin-in
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Figure 4. Time Series Plot of Illinois coin-in from 2000-2006 which details the lack of 
negative or positive trend in the data.
A number of the dummy variables representing the months proved to be statistically 
insignificant when measured at the .05 significance threshold. For example; the February 
dummy variable was eliminated based on the inability to reject Ho = 0 (p=.899). Based 
on the same standard; June, September, October, November, and December were all 
discarder from the regression equation. Discussion of possible reasons for the lack of 
significance will be presented at the end of the chapter.
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The remaining variables were then retested with the following results:
The regression equation is
state coin-in = 1.95E+09 + 1.7 4E+08 DMar + l.OOE+08 DApr + 1.29E+08 DMay 
+ 1.58E+08 DJul + 75702571 DAug - 1.36E+08 70% + Et
Predictor Coef SE Coef T P VIF
Constant 1947191948 94 73 87 3 2 0 5 . 5 3 0 . 0 0 0
DMar 174174857 24166114 7.21 0 . 000 1. 048
DApr 100351571 24166114 4 . 15 0 . 000 1 . 0 4 8
DMay 129199571 24166114 5.35 0 . 0 0 0 1 . 048
DJul 158437546 2 4 2 5 2 6 2 1 6 . 5 3 0 . 0 0 0 1.055
DAug 75702571 24166114 3 . 1 3 0 . 0 0 2 1 . 048
70% - 1 3 6 3 3 7 8 2 0 1 4 3 2 6 1 3 3 - 9 . 5 2 0 . 000 1 . 0 0 8
S = 59808082 R-Sq = 71.0% R-Sq(adj) = 68.8%
Analysis of Variance
Source DF SS MS F P
Regression 6 6.75878E+17 1.12646E+17 31.49 0.000
Residual Error 77 2.75430E+17 3.57701E+15
Total 83 9.51308E+17___________________________
Figure 5. Minitab output detailing final regression equation.
All coefficients were found to be significant at the .05 level, thus rejecting all null 
hypotheses. Most significantly, the variable representing the Illinois 2003 70% tax and 
overall tax restructuring was found to be a statistically significant (p -  .000) factor on 
gaming demand as represented by statewide coin-in. Variance inflation factors (VIF), 
which indicate potential multicollinearity were also calculated. Numbers over 10 indicate 
a significant multicollinearity problem, however the results all show a VIF under 2, 
which is considered acceptable and indicates that multicollinearity is not an issue with the 
model.
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The residuals were tested with Minitab 15 for autocorrelation as shown in Figure 6:
Autocorrelation Function for RESI2
(with 5% significance limits for the autocorrelations)
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Partial Autocorrelation Function for RESI2
(with 5% significance limits for the partial autocorrelations)
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Figure 6. ACF and PACF Minitab plots of regression residuals.
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The ACF plot depicted in Figure 6, also called the sample autocorrelation function 
(SAC) and the PACF also called the sample partial autocorrelation function are used to 
define the correct Box Jenkins model. The behavior, severity, and pattern of spikes 
determine which model is the best fit.
The spikes revealed on the above autocorrelation function for Residual 2 suggest the 
influence of autocorrelation in the error term of the first lag (1 month). An ARIMA or 
Box Jenkins model is adopted to resolve the issue of autocorrelation. Based on the spike 
at lag one of the autocorrelation chart, a non seasonal (0,0,1) ARIMA model was used. 
The (0,0,1) ARIMA residuals (Residual 3) were then examined to access whether the 
autocorrelation problem was resolved.
Autocorrelation Function for RESI3
(with 5% significance limits for the autocorrelations)
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Figure 7. ACF Minitab output confirming the effect of (0,0,1) ARIMA.
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The autocorrelation function for RESI3 confirms that the autocorrelation issues were 
successfully addressed. The final regression equation is now modified to reflect the Box 
Jenkins.
Illinois coin-in = 1.95E+09 + 1.74E+08 DMar + 1 .OOE+08 DApr + 1.29E+08 DMay 
+ 1.58E+08 DJul + 75702571 DAug - 1.36E+08 70% + e,
Where ei = ai + .2264a / - 1 where a i- \~  N (0 , )
The notations in the final regression equation reflect the following. “E” is a scientific 
notation for an exponential. In the above example; 1.95E+09 is the same as 1.95 billion. 
The “e” in the equation represents the error term for the regression equation. The “a” 
signifies the error term from the Box Jenkins treatment. The following figure depicts the 
output of the ARIMA:
ARIMA Model: RESI2
Final Estimates of Parameters
Type Coef SE Coef ■ T P
IÆA 1 - 0 . 2 2 6 4  0 . 1 0 8 5  - 2 . 0 9  0 . 0 4 0
Number of observations: 84
Residuals: SS = 2592 90087 53352717 0 (backforecasts excluded)
MS -  3 1 2 3 9 7 6 9 5 8 2 3 5 2 6 7  DF = 83
Modified Box-Pierce (Ljung-Box) Chi-Square statistic
Lag 12  24 36 48
Chi-Square 1 1 . 3  32.4 46.8 65.2
DF 11 23 35 47
P-Value 0 . 4 2 0  0.091 0.087 0.040
Figure 8. Minitab final (0,0,1) ARIMA output. “MA” as noted under “Type” refers to 
moving average.
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The Chi-Square presented towards the bottom of Figure 8 confirms behavior of the 
ACF graph from Figure 7. The Chi-Square “Lag 12” column (bold type column in 
Figure 8) has a P-Value of .420 which is the result of testing if the correlations up to lag 
12 are significant or not. The lag correlations are tested by the chi-square by setting up 
each lag as a null hypothesis. The null hypotheses all state that no correlation of lags 
exists. The alternate hypothesis in this case states that there exists a correlation. The 
.420 indicates that the null should not be rejected and there is no correlation in the final 
model.
The regression equation reported an R squared of 71%. R squared represents the 
proportion o f the sample variation o f coin-in that was due to the variation of the 
independent variables in the final regression equation. The ideal R squared value is 1 or 
100%.
Discussion o f  Results
The regression model confirms that the 2003 Illinois Tax Restructuring had a 
negative effect on gaming demand. Trend was not a component in the final model. 
Previous tax increases, increased competition with surrounding states, and the increase in 
price for the final Illinois docksite license which hindered the sale of the last license all 
contribute to explain the overall lack of change in coin-in trend. The months of March, 
April, May, July, and August were all significant positive seasonal components in the 
final regression model. It should be remembered that Illinois is a Midwestern state were 
weather plays a factor in most activities. This may explain why the spring and summer 
months reveal a positive influence on gaming demand. It is conceivable that June does
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not reflect this increase since it is associated with the end of the school year and families 
might vacation around non-garning activities.
Conclusion
The regression modeling o f assessing impact o f the 2003 Illinois tax restructuring on 
gaming demand successfully demonstrated a statistically significant negative correlation. 
The increased taxes resulted in decreased gaming demand. The following chapter will 
discuss inherent limitations, managerial implications, and lastly provide guidance for 
future research.
CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Introduction
This chapter focuses on conclusions that can be drawn from the results section of the 
data analysis. In addition, implications of the results as well as recommendations for 
future studies are discussed. The general purpose of the research was to investigate 
whether the gaming industry was governed by the same economic forces with respect to 
taxation as other industries and specifically the main research question asked whether 
increases in gaming taxes resulted in a decrease in gaming demand.
The research project entailed obtaining Illinois state monthly coin-in data from 
January 2000 to December 2006. After a thorough literature review, the researcher 
chose regression analysis with dummy variables to model the intervention of the 2003 
70% gaming tax and the general gaming tax restructuring. Dummy variables measuring 
seasonality in the monthly data were also included in the regression model. Finally, 
because the regression’s error terms indicated autocorrelation a Box Jenkins model was 
employed to resolve this issue.
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Findings and Contributions
The results o f the study support the findings o f research on occupancy taxes, real 
estate taxation, and sin taxes that have consistently found a negative correlation between 
demand and increased taxation and restrictions. Specifically, this thesis supports the 
research hypothesis predicting that increased gaming taxes will have a negative impact on 
gaming demand.
Despite frequent editorial supposition estimating the impact of increases in gaming 
taxes on the commercial gaming industry, there exists no prior empirical study examining 
this issue the knowledge o f this researcher. Previous research has addressed changes in 
commercial gaming restrictions with similar results. Commercial gaming’s stakeholders 
have frequently advocated the economic penalties inherent in inflated gaming taxation 
but have been unable to reference academically rigorous research supporting or refuting 
their position.
Limitations
As mentioned in the introduction, the findings o f this thesis must be considered with 
regard to the inherent limitations. Since this research analyzes only a single tax increase 
in a single Midwestern state in the United States, the degree to which the results are 
generalizable is limited. Further study of other state tax changes and possibly tax 
restructuring in foreign locales will help address this limitation. Coin-in while ostensibly 
the best representative o f gaming demand does not constitute the entire revenue equation. 
Therefore understanding the table game contribution to revenue will strengthen the 
understanding of the correlation between gaming taxation and gaming demand. Further
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insight into table games play will become possible when tracking systems for table games 
become both more prevalent and effective.
Recommendations fo r  Further Study
Table and games analysis
Although slot revenue comprises the greatest proportion of Illinois total gaming 
revenue, table play nevertheless fulfills an important function in the overall revenue mix. 
In addition, it is unclear whether table players are more or less impacted by expense 
alterations in conjunction to tax changes. Therefore understanding this market segment is 
critical and slot demand should not be assumed to reflect generalized gaming demand 
which includes table games. The ability to measure table game play should improve as 
casino based table game systems become more efficient and more widely adopted.
Managerial Implications
Much speculation has been cast upon the adjustments managers o f commercial 
gaming operations invoke when pressured by increased gaming taxes. Future research 
attempting to uncover whether and to what degree marketing expenditures, capital 
improvement, and employee retention/hiring rates are curtailed would be useful.
Comparison across States
Further analysis of the impact o f other states gaming tax changes and the effect on 
gaming demand would contribute to a comprehensive understanding of the relationship 
between gaming taxes and gaming demand. It is conceivable that other Midwestern 
states with limited gaming licenses are either more or less tolerant to gaming tax 
increases than less restricted states such as Nevada or Mississippi. In addition, research 
designed to understand how gaming tax restructuring affects gaming demand in
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neighboring states might serve to illuminate the interstate balance among commercial 
gaming states. If gaming tax increases move gaming demand and tax receipts from the 
legislator’s own state to their neighbor, state governments may became increasingly 
cautionary before making drastic changes.
Conclusion
By examining the relationship between the 2003 Illinois tax restructuring and coin-in 
this thesis indicates that increases in gaming taxation had a significant negative effect on 
Illinois gaming demand. A multiple regression model utilizing dummy variables was 
developed to analyze coin-in data collected from the Illinois Gaming Board representing 
the time period o f January 2000 to December 2006. Since the regression equation’s error 
terms reflected autocorrelation, a Box Jenkins model was incorporated to resolve this 
issue.
The results o f this study affirm previous inquiry into the relationship between hotel 
room demand and increases in occupancy taxes. Furthermore, this thesis reinforces the 
findings o f prior studies which identified a correlation between increases in cigarette 
taxes and decreased tobacco consumption; and also supports studies examining the 
negative impact on real estate investors from the 1986 Tax Reform Act.
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